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Comments by Commenter

  • Alexandru Frunza-Nicolescu

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      MicrosoftInternetExplorer4

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      In relation with the positive obligation by States to protect individuals against crime, here included crimes against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer systems or by means of computer systems, we propose that the following question be added under this theme:

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      A.X       Is there a legal framework to protect individuals against offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer systems or by means of computer systems?
       
      Indicator:
      ·    Substantive criminal law provisions on cybercrime in line with international standards such as the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime.
      ·        Procedural powers to secure electronic evidence for use in criminal proceedings and subject to rule of law conditions and safeguards in line with international standards such as the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime

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      MicrosoftInternetExplorer4

      In relation with the positive obligation by States to protect individuals against crime, here included crimes against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer systems or by means of computer systems, we propose that the  following question and indicator are added :

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      F.X       Is the Government able to carry out domestic investigations and cooperate internationally on cybercrime and other crimes involving evidence on computer systems?
       
      Indicator:
      ·         Domestic substantive and procedural law on cybercrime and electronic evidence (cross-reference to [proposed] question A.X of Category A/Theme A
      ·         Availability of specialised cybercrime units within police or prosecution services and of computer forensic services.
      ·    Availability of training programmes and other measures to strengthen the capacities of criminal justice authorities (judges, prosecutors, police).
      ·       Membership in international agreements on cybercrime such as the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime.

  • Anonymous

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      A third indicator could be added under the question E.3 “Are services available which enable citizens to access and use local scripts and languages online?”, namely: Availability of Internet domains and websites in severely and critically endangered languages, if on country’s territory. Alternatively, the question about internet content of and public support to severely and critically endangered languages can be added as a new E.5 question at the end of the theme.

    • Why in this case, in the context of rights on freedom of expression we do not ask about availability of public spaces with free on-line services?

    • F.1 must be updated to: “Do school and higher educational curricula include training in ICTs and Internet, focused on effective and safe use, including critical online media literacy, and are these curricula implemented in practice?

    • First of all, it is theme D and Question shall be D.3, right? Crosscutting indicator D.3 says now: “Have there been significant breaches of cybersecurity in the country within the last three years?”, and the first indicator indicates Number and extent of breaches, and numbers of citizens and businesses affected. It should be clarified does this question and indicator leave outside a situation if a country is facing a cyber-attack, for instance from another country? What if outside forces with massive attack have threatened country’s usually normal cybersecurity? Perhaps the whole question D.3 should be clarified.

  • Augusto Herrmann Batista

    • This item, while important, is out of place in this section, as it is not related to “Openness – THEME E – OPEN DATA”. I think it should be moved to “Accessible to all – THEME E – LOCAL CONTENT AND LANGUAGE”, as it will better contextualize it.

    • Existence of open data initiatives, backed by a legal framework, in all branches and levels of government

    • Number and quantity of dataset are not good measurements for an indicator. Datasets can be easily divided into multiple parts to give the appearance of a higher number. Instead, the indicator should check whether or not data is available in each of a list of prioritized areas, just as the Global Open Data Index and Open Data Barometer do.

       

      Availability of public access facilities to access open data, while a debatable idea in itself (shouldn’t we encourage further usage of open data in existing public facilities and educational institutions instead?), holds more relation to the “Accessible to all” principle than to “Openness”. So, at least, it should be moved there.

    • The issue, while important, bears more relation to “Rights – THEME E – PRIVACY” than to “Openness – THEME E – Open Data”. When data is selected for publication as open data, it is supposed to have already have undergone privacy considerations and any personally identifiable information stripped out. It does not make sense to talk about data retention and cross-border policy for data that is already open data, and thus not personally identifiable.

       

      Should be moved to “Rights – THEME E – PRIVACY”.

    • Considering that copyright legislation makes everything restrictive by default, the indicator should be more clear in demanding a clear legal provision exempting government data from copyright, or the existence of a default open licensing system.

      See the research report: “Avoiding Data Use Silos“, by Danny Lämmerhirt, an Open Knowledge International research paper.

  • Chris Zielinski

    • “The freedom to seek… information” is not enough. Access to knowledge is essential, and that some knowledge is essential to human development (UNESCO calls for “equitable and affordable access by all citizens to information infrastructure (notably to the Internet) and to information and knowledge essential to collective and individual human development” in its “Recommendation concerning the Promotion and Use of Multilingualism and Universal Access to Cyberspace, http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/pdf/ifap2003_draft_recommendation.pdf). This shold be referred to in this preamble.

    • The UNESCO document, “Recommendation concerning the promotion and use of multilingualism and universal access to cyberspace” (http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=17717&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html), among other things ,calls for “Universal access to cyberspace” which it defines as “equitable and affordable access by all citizens to information infrastructure (notably to the Internet) and to information and knowledge essential to collective and individual human development”.

      The unhindered access of everyone to information and knowledge essential to collective and individual human development is crucial, particularly (and almost by definition) in developing countries. In case anyone is concerned that such “essential information” cannot be defined, note that the Appendix to the Berne Convention carries such a definition.

      This could be included in the indicator currently proposed under item C.1 (my proposed addition is underlined below):

      C.1 Is the right to information guaranteed in law and respected in practice?

      Indicators:

      •  Constitutional or legal guarantee of access to information and knowledge essential to collective and individual human development consistent with international rights agreements (including regional agreements) and evidence that it is respected and enforced by government

  • Data Protection Unit, Council of Europe

  • Emna Chaabane

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      Le chiffrement est un moyen, parmi d’autres, qui sert à assurer la confidentialité des données. Les trois principaux critères de cybersécurité qui doivent être prise en considération pour s’assurer de la sécurité des données et des services de gouvernement en ligne, et hors ligne sont :
      La confidentialité, l’intégrité et la disponibilité.
      Proposition de modification du deuxième et troisième indicateur de la catégorie D.4 :
      –          Les mesures prises pour s’assurer de l’intégrité et de la confidentialité des données des sites du gouvernement en ligne : chiffrement, mesure pour la sécurité des données, protection anti-DDoS ….
      –          Rapport crédible d’évaluation, par rapport à une norme ou à un standard, relatif au niveau de sécurité des sites et des services du gouvernement (par exemple, utilisation de https, rapport d’audit de la sécurité par rapport à des normes et des standards internationaux …)

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      On propose d’ajouter un indicateur sur le nombre des jeunes / enfants victimes des crimes sur Internet, harcèlement, manipulation, jeux dangereux (tel que Blue Fish Game …)

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      – Existence d’un ERUI (ou CERT , CSIRT, CIRT …) national, gouvernemental et sectoriel, avec reconnaissance internationale/ régionale, et données confirmant son efficacité.
      – Le niveau de coopération internationale en matière de cybersécurité

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      –  Concernant l’indicateur « Nombre et ampleur des brèches, et nombre de citoyens et d’entreprises affectées » : ce sont des données sensibles et il y a une réticence à partager ce type de données pour des raisons de sécurité

      –      Concernant le 3ème indicateur: Dispositions et données sur le hameçonnage, les spams, les programmes automatiques, ransomware et DDoS 

    • le 3ème indicateur:

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      Mesure dans laquelle les services de chiffrement sont utilisés par les citoyens et les entreprises, par exemple, le nombre de certificat électronique, la signature électronique, infrastructure PKI

  • Erika Smith

    • When talking about groups of ppl women are usually lumped with children which has an infantalising effect on women. The cross-cuts appropriately examine the issue of gender rather than women – why not start with children as the only group described and move gender to issues such as sustainable development, gender, trust, etc. to break away from this protectionist practice.
       

    •  
      Is this beyond the control of national governments to monitor – as it is written it seems to be referring to the ToS of internet intermediaries?  Certainly report and redress mechanisms for internet services – social media and otherwise – are an important factor to measure. However,  availability and awareness of efficient reporting mechanisms to government/police authorities, who in turn should be equipped with training and protocols (including appropriate digital documentation to serve as legal proof) and capacity for swift coordination with II following due process to request take down or other data would seem more appropriate aspects of indicators here.
       

    • Agree with above proposal from council of europe.  Also, hopefully national “due process” frameworks in general  would only allow for very restricted access regarding the types of authorities whose competency might include obtaining data or requesting takedowns by internet intermediaries.  In some countries the legal framework exists but grants such access to information to a broad range of government representatives, or  is so cumbersome as to be impossible to implement in a timely fashion. Therefore, just having a legal framework on due process is insufficient.

    • Agree with Jessica Dheere’s comment above. Indicator offered looks at access more than content generation – internet use would mean both information consumption and creation. Minimally an indicator of active users (versus passive consumers) would be available nationally and geographically.  Quanitity of content produced quantified by issue or by who is producing the content may be more complex information to obtain from II but would be relevant here.  Even terms like blogger and microblogger will rapidly be outdated, you may want to consider content generators or some other more generic term.

    • Phrase could be read that the abuse is being practied by  women etc. rather than online censorship. Would be relevant to include other marginalised populations such as LGBTQI or ppl subject to racial discrimination to fully understand if and how vastly self-censorship is employed bu ppl who frequently face more attack.

    • Strongly agree with above observation from Council of Europe, intimidation comes in many ways – from bots to death and rape threats  – would one indicator be a reporting mechanism for this type of intimidation? Would a further indicator in this section link to national gov’t respect of the rights to encryption and to anonymity? (also relevant to 182)  c.2 refers to accessing information, should we not look at defamation and other charges for publishing such information?

    • Without examining UNDESA’s indices, any government policy for e-government and e-participation would necessarily need to be fully intersectional – and gender, geographic, age and race sensitive.  Do e-governmnet policies contemplate generating active participation  from an intersectional point of view?

    • This indicator would be stronger if it repeated/reflected the emphasis of neccessary and proportionate above, otherwise it could be interpreted  that the indicator requires having name registration on such services, that no registration required is not an option.

    • Should indicators in this section also reflect absence of internet and  communications shut downs?

    • legal framework around encryption and privacy, or add encryption alongside VPNs?

    • Having the proportion of adult citizens information aggregated and disaggregated  – ie by geographic location, age, ethnicity, gender, etc.

    • This indicator only established that there is government responsibility but guarantees no will or actual effective implementation of functional public access points – it in no way guarantees availability as implied in A.5  This is linked to 352, as well  – an indicator reflecting monitoring and evaluation practices to understand intersectional use especially use by those traditionally excluded from the internet such as older people or those who face discrimination when they occupy the internet.

    • This seems to be a repeat of 352

    • These perceptions should be examined fro an intersectional perspective, including perceptions of women and men, rural households

    • Important that the disaggregated information, in addition to taking gender into consideration as cited in the cross cuts, should look at geographic and age distribution of skillsets. STEM and higher education students information should also be disaggregated.

    • I believe my comment on 426 was applied to a section above. The importance of disaggregate information also reflecting age and geographic location, and ensuring that STEM and education data is disaggregated.

    • Regarding existence of national mechanisms for monitoring, in general monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are important indicators missing in several sections. This particular mention focusses only on access and use and not governance or decision-making.  Noting too that policy making regarding the internet does not only happen in govenrment spaces.

    • The final indicator would also be appropriate for A1. How to include the importance of intersectional gender disaggregation?  Barriers and value will differ depending on ethnicity, geographic location age, etc.

    • These indicators reflect access and consumer use but not necessarily differentiated use. Imporatnt to understand content production and possibly social media influence achieved.

    • I find this statement offensive. It seems to put rights in as balance and assumes that to address women’s right to live free of gender-based violence as something that should be subsumed to other (implicitly more important) rights. Rather it is important to know if there are proper redress mechanisms and remedies – legal and otherwise – for online gender based violence. indicators sought could emphasise a a necessary and proportionate response, and one that is not protectionist. APC’s report to the SR on VAW regarding gender-based violence may provide insight for these indicators.

    • Not clear why it is necessary to separate harassment and violence as harrassment is a form of violence. An indicator on the existence of reporting mechanisms for online GBV could be relevant here.

    • Is it possible to add and sexuality or sexual identity after sexual health?  In the indicators it may be easier to expect monitoring of extent of the access to this type of information, rather than the extent of use (as ell as ease of access).

    • Ease and extent of access? Rather than ease of access and extent of use.

    • An indicator on having a reporting mechanism also relevant here? May be important to explicitly include LGBTQI people. HRD and journalists are main targets for abuse although they may not identify as political activists.

  • Jessica Dheere

  • Media and Internet Division, Council of Europe

    • Internet freedom indicators (appended to the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation (2016)5 on Internet Freedom) (hereafter – CoE Internet Freedom Indicators) could be a valuable source of inspiration and a reference point for Theme A – Policy, Legal and Regulatory Framework (especially indicators contained in section 1 “An enabling environment for internet freedom” and in section 5 “Remedies”).

       

       

       

    • “Accepted in principle” appears to be a very broad wording which might cause serious difficulties in measuring this indicator

       

       

       

    • Proposal: replace “due process” with “effective remedies”.

       

       

       

    • Proposal: add an indicator for availability of information about effective remedies to address violations of rights by state and non-state actors

       

       

       

    • Proposal: rephrase into “Existence of an established legal framework for effective remedies”.

       

       

       

    • CoE Internet Freedom Indicators could be a valuable source of inspiration and a reference point for Theme B – Freedom of Expression (especially indicators contained in section 2 “The right to freedom of expression” and in section 5 “Remedies”).

       

       

       

    • Proposal:

      – add “other” after “or” in the 1st and 2nd indicators;

      – add at the end of the first sentence “and by other competent authorities” (Comment: courts play an important role in ensuring that guarantees of the freedom of expression are respected and implemented)

       

       

       

    • General comments:

       

      The CoE Internet Freedom Indicators (subsection 2.4 “Legality, legitimacy and proportionality of restrictions”) could serve as a reference point for this question and the indicators related to it.

       

      Specific comments:

       

      From the current version it is not clear whether the question seeks to find out (a) if the restrictions applied in practice are “narrowly defined, transparent, …” (that is, refers to implementation issues) or (b) if the restrictions provided for by law are “narrowly defined, transparent, …” (that is, refers to the quality of law).

       

      In the (a) case it would be crucially important to highlight that all restrictions applied in practice must be based on law. The corresponding indicators must therefore make it possible to verify that no restrictions lacking legal basis are imposed on the exercise of the freedom of expression.

      Also, after “in policy and practice” add “based on law, “. Comment: Any existing restrictions on the freedom of expression must be based on law (Article 19 ICCPR)

       

    • Further elaboration of this question and of the corresponding indicators appears adviseable.

       

      The term “censorship” has no unique definition agreed at the international level. Also, in practice this term would usually be used for restrictions on the freedom of expression exercised by professionals (i.e., academic expression, artistic expression, journalism) and is hardly appropriate for user-generated online content.

       

      Furthermore, in the cases where internet intermediaries apply content restrictions, the question of grounds for such restrictions, and especially of their transparency is of crucial importance, which shall be reflected in the corresponding indicators.

       

       

    • The indicator does not cover the second part of the question (grounds for the restrictions).

       

       

       

    • General comment:

      The CoE Internet Freedom Indicators (subsection 2.1 “Freedom to access the internet”) could serve as a reference point for this question and the indicators related to it.

      Specific comments: replace “citizens” with “individuals”. (Comment: states have an obligation to secure human rights and freedoms to everyone within their jurisdiction, not to their citizens only.)

       

       

       

       

       

    • General comment:

       

      The CoE Internet Freedom Indicators (subsection 2.4 “Legality, legitimacy and proportionality of restrictions”) could serve as a reference point for the second indicator indicator.

       

      Specific comments:

       

      Information on the existence of legal restrictions as such would not be sufficient for drawing any concrete conclusions. It is necessary that the indicator allows to assess whether the existing restrictions are based on law, pursue a legitimate aim and are proportionate to the aim pursued.

       

    • General comment:

      Possibly it would be best to separate interferences with the exercise of the freedom of expression by journalists and other media actors from interferences with the exercise of the freedom of expression by individuals.

      The CoE Internet Freedom Indicators (subsection 2.3 “Freedom of the media”) could serve as a reference point for this question and the indicators related to it.

      Specific comments:

      – it is proposed to replace “citizens” with “individuals”. Comment: states have an obligation to secure human rights and freedoms to everyone within their jurisdiction, not to their citizens only;

      – it is proposed to replace “bloggers” with “other media actors” or “other actors performing “public watchdog” functions”. Such phrasing would also include, for instance, whistleblowers, which are another important category to be taken into account.

       

       

       

       

    • The second indicator does not take into account instances of intimidation, threats and all other possible means of interference with the freedom of expression not involving legal procedures. At the same time, it is these types of interference that are concerningly widespread.

       

       

    • Proposal: replace “citizens” with “individuals”.

      Comment: states have an obligation to secure human rights and freedoms to everyone within their jurisdiction, not to their citizens only.

       

    • Proposal: replace “bloggers” with “other media actors” or “other actors performing “public watchdog” functions”. Such phrasing would also include, for instance, whistleblowers, which are another important category to be taken into account.

       

       

       

    • CoE Internet Freedom Indicators (especially indicators contained in section 2 “The right to freedom of expression” and in section 5 “Remedies”) could be a valuable source of inspiration and a reference point for Theme C – Right to Information.

       

       

       

    • Proposal: add “other” after “or”.

       

       

       

    • General comment:

      The CoE Internet Freedom Indicators (subsection 2.2 “Freedom of opinion and the right to receive and impart information”) could serve as a reference point for this question and the indicators related to it.

       

       

      Specific comments: it is proposed to replace “filter” with “restrict”

       

       

    • The proposed indicators do not cover the second part of the question regarding the grounds for interference.

       

       

       

    • Proposals:

      – replace “citizens” with “individuals”. Comment: states have an obligation to secure human rights and freedoms to everyone within their jurisdiction, not to their citizens only;

      – replace “bloggers” with “other media actors” or “other actors performing “public watchdog” functions”. Such phrasing would also include, for instance, whistleblowers, which are another important category to be taken into account.

       

       

       

    • The second indicator does not take into account instances of intimidation, threats and all other possible means of interference with the right to information not involving legal procedures. At the same time, it is these types of interference that are the concerningly widespread.

       

       

    • CoE Internet Freedom Indicators (especially indicators contained in section 3 “The right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association” and in section 5 “Remedies”) could be a valuable source of inspiration and a reference point for Theme D – Freedom of Association and the Right to participate in Public Life.

       

       

       

    • Proposal: add at the end of the sentence “and by other competent authorities”

      Comment: courts play an important role in ensuring that guarantees of the freedom of expression are respected and implemented

       

       

       

    • CoE Internet Freedom Indicators (especially indicators contained in section 4 “The right to private and family life” and in section 5 “Remedies”) could be a valuable source of inspiration and a reference point for Theme E – Privacy.

       

       

       

    • It would possibly be more appropriate to use the term “individuals” or “internet users” as participation in cultural activity (as opposed to, i.e., political) is not reserved for citizens only.

       

       

       

    • Proposal: in the third indicator add “other” after “or”.

       

       

    • In the fourth indicator it would be more appropriate to use the term “individuals” as e-government services are not reserved for citizens only

       

       

       

    • General comment:

       

      The CoE Internet Freedom Indicators (subsection 2.4 “Legality, legitimacy and proportionality of restrictions”) could serve as a reference point for the second indicator.

       

      Specific comments:

       

      Information on the existence of legal restrictions as such would not be sufficient for drawing any concrete conclusions. It is necessary that the indicator allows to assess whether the existing restrictions are based on law, pursue a legitimate aim and are proportionate to the aim pursued.

       

       

    • The CoE Internet Freedom Indicators (subsection 2.1 “Freedom to access the internet”) could serve as a reference point for this section.

       

       

       

    • It would be more appropriate to use the term “individuals” instead of “citizens”.

       

       

    • Proposal: after “Constitutional” add “, other legal”

       

       

       

    • Proposal: replace “consumers” with “internet users”.

       

       

       

    • In the second indicator it appears more appropriate to use the term “individuals” instead of “citizens”.

       

       

    • In the question and in the corresponding indicators it would appear more appropriate to refer to “individuals” rather then “citizens”

       

       

    • Proposal: consider adding an indicator revealing restrictions on the use of encryption

       

       

    • In the first indicator it would appear more appropriate to refer to “individuals” instead of “citizens”

       

       

    • Proposal: consider adding an indicator revealing the existence of reporting mechanisms

       

       

       

  • Sana El Harbi

  • Tom Mackenzie

  • Valeria Betancourt

    • I suggest “governance” is included in the first para, as follows:  Internet Universality’s second principle is that the Internet and its governance should be open for all to develop, participate in it or take advantage of its resources and opportunities in whatever ways seem most appropriate or valuable to them.

      The rationale for the suggestion above is that limiting the conceptualisation of this principle to open government poses the risk to also confining decision making processes related to technical issues, markets, content, trust in the internet and internet-enabled services to closed circles of the ones who hold political and economic power. For the multistakeholder approach to be effectively adopted and implemented and contribute to reinforce the public and open nature of the internet, it has to be integrated at all levels.

       

    • The public interest principle/aspect should be emphasised here.  I suggest adding it as follows:  An appropriate policy, legal and regulatory framework – including research support, standardisation and multistakeholder governance structures – is necessary to support an evidence-based, transparent and forward-looking policymaking process that will preserve the Internet as an open, public and universal resource.

    • When it has to do with innovations and the legal, regulatory and policy framework, it would be important to include an indicator related to the arrangements to allow consistency between protecting the interests of creators and the right of people to freely participate in scientific, technological and knowledge flows.

    • Maybe better to use “public policy and practice” instead of “government policy and practice”.

    • – Extent to which FOSS is used in the public education system/institutions.

    • Apart from the legal and regulatory arrangements, it would be useful to include and indicator on perceptions of arrangements for management of spectrum, domain names (particularly the ccTLD) and IP addresses.

    • The first indicator should perhaps be complemented with ones on:
      – the existence of specific initiatives and projects on access to knowledge and open content
      – perceptions of level of effectiveness of public policies and practices on access to knowledge

      In addition, there is an immense amount of knowledge that is produced with private funds but that is clearly of public interest and that should be publicly accessed. This is a critical issue in developing countries or emerging economies in which the bulk of knowledge is NOT generated with public funds because of various reasons, including low levels of  research capacity or because the financial resources allocated to research and knowledge production is limited.

      It would be good to include an indicator that addresses the extent to which knowledge generated with private funds  that is of public interest  is freely/openly accessible.

    • Regulatory arrangements and practice concerning net neutrality.

    • Is it deliberate that only this question refers to ‘other public stakeholders’ while there is no mention to them in the rest?

    • Sugiero añadir  el asunto de la gobernanza en la primera frase:  El segundo principio de universalidad de internet es que internet y su gobernanza deberían ser abiertas para que toda persona pueda desarrollarla, participar en ella, o aprovechar sus recursos y oportunidades en la forma en que le parezca más adecuada y valiosa.

  • Youth IGF ambassador in South Sudan

  • кафедра "Журналистика и переводческое дело" университета "Туран"

  • Сергей Карпов

Source: http://internetuniversality.apc.org/index.php/comments-by-commenter/